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Abstract
Healthier food diet is likely to prevent numerous non communicable diseases. Then there is a
growing interest in evaluating the impact of food price taxation on food consumption. However,
strategic reactions of both manufacturers and retailers are missing in empirical analyses. Rather,
passive pricing is assumed. Ignoring strategic pricing might lead to under-estimate or over-estimate
the impact of food taxation. Based on the example of the soft drink industry, we analyse the bias
which is introduced when assuming passive pricing. Using structural econometric model, we ﬁrst
estimate models of vertical relationships between the beverage industry and the retail industry. After
selecting the ’best’ model of vertical relationships, we then simulate diﬀerent scenrios of input cost
changes or ﬁnal products taxation. Our results indicate that assuming passive pricing by ﬁrms leads
to under-estimate the impact on food consumption. In our example, the under-estimation amounts to
15% for regular products and 50% for diet ones when contracts between manufacturers and retailers
are not taken into account. We thus conclude that for empirical analysis of food price policies for
better health, considering strategic pricing is a key issue.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to the world health organization, non communicable diseases, cause about 35 million deaths
each year representing about 60% of all deaths globally.1 Moreover up to 80% of heart disease, stroke, and
type 2 diabetes and over a third of cancers could be prevented by eliminating shared risk factors, mainly
tobacco use, unhealthy diet, physical inactivity and the harmful use of alcohol. A related consequence
of unhealthy diet and physical inactivity is the rise in obesity prevalence. To tackle this public health
problem, governments have tried to use public information campaigns in the aim to get people to change
their food habits. These information campaigns may have positive impacts (??)o r n o i m p a c t ( ?)o n
food consumption. However, they seem to have not been suﬃciently eﬀective at changing behavior (?),
and have failed to reverse the rising trend in obesity, diabetes and so on. In other areas legislation and
taxation have proved more eﬀective as it is the case for cigarettes (?). These policy tools have been
shown to be eﬀective, and are now being considered as tools to inﬂuence consumer behavior to improve
diets and therefore public health.
As the link between food intake and health is more and more recognised, there is a growing interest
in the ex ante analysis of the health impacts of alternative food price policies. The general methodology
used is a two-stage procedure which combines a demand model and a health model. The demand model is
used to assess the impact on food or nutrient consumption of alternative policies. Then, the health model
assesses the impact of food consumption changes on health. For example, ?, ?, ?, ? use epidemiological
models to assess the impact on death, ?, ?, ?, ? look at the eﬀect on some health related indicators such
as diet quality or nutrient content. Whatever the way the second stage is developped, a key issue is the
demand analysis.
A common limit of almost all these analysis is the assumption of passive pricing that is producers
and retailers are supposed not to adjust product prices in response to the tax (subsidy) policy. The only
example of integrating strategic pricing is Griﬃth et al. (2010) who account for a strategic behavior at
the manufacturer level. However they ignore manufacturer and retailers relationships. Both the food
and the retail food industries are characterised by large ﬁrms with market power, and therefore taxes
are unlikely to be perfectly passed through. Economic studies on retail pass-through of upstream cost
changes conclude to imperfect pass-through (?????). A major explanation is the markup adjustment of
manufacturers and retailers due to consumer substitution patterns, market structure, and market power
in industries. Overall this literature suggest that ﬁnal food prices are likely to be adjusted in response to
a tax (subsidy) policy.
It is frequently argued that assuming passive pricing provides an upper bound of the impact of the
policy (e.g. ?, p.238). This statement is true only if producers do not fully transmit the impact of the
tax (subsidy). However, in some cases, particularly in the monopoly case, the retail price transmission
could be larger than 1. In this case, passive pricing assumption leads to under-estimating the impact of
at a x .
In this paper, using the example of the sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs) industry, we show that
ignoring ﬁrms strategic pricing when evaluating the impact of food tax/subsidy policies might lead to
under-estimating the impact of such policies. We choose this industry for many reasons. First, there is
strong evidence that consumption of SSBs is a contributor to the ‘epidemic’ of obesity (??). Second, the
industry is highly concentrated making the possibility of strategic pricing more likely. Third, an on-going
reform of the sugar policy in the EU might signiﬁcantly aﬀect the price of the main input used for SSBs
production.
The originality of our approach is to deal with a vertical chain composed of oligopolies because
both the soft drink industry and the retail industry are highly concentrated. This paper uses structural
1World Health Organization, 2008-2013 Action Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Non-
communicable Diseases. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597418_eng.pdf (accessed 2010, December
17)
2econometric models that accounts for the structure of the industry. From estimates of consumers’ demand
on the French soft drink market, we recover price cost margins from several supply models as in ? and
?. We then select the model ﬁtting best the data. Using this selected model, we quantify the impact
on prices, markets shares of the diﬀerent SSBs and on household consumption of a decrease in the sugar
price. We ﬁnd that the industry over-transmits a change in input cost. According to our results ignoring
strategic pricing by the industry leads to under-estimate the impact on consumption by 15% for regular
products and 50% for diet ones. This strongly militates for integrating strategic pricing in the ex ante
analysis of food taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main characteristics of the soft drink industry.
Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics about soft drink consumption. Section 4 describes
the model and methods which are used to analyse the demand and to infer the more likely vertical
relationships between manufacturers and retailers. In section 5 we discuss demand and supply results,
cost estimates. In section 6 we present results of policy simulations and we ﬁnally conclude in section 7.
2 The Soft Drink market
In 2004, the turnover of the French soft drink industry reaches 2.2 billion euros, that is 1.6% of the total
turnover of the French food industry. Soft drinks represent about 11% of total beverages consumption in
France which includes mineral water, alcohol, coﬀee, tea, drinking milk as well as fruit juices. On average,
soft drink consumption increased by 32% from 1994 to 2004. Nevertheless, per capita consumption in
France (42.5 litres per year) remains low as compared to per capita consumption in the EU (71.2 litres
in average). The three main categories are colas (54% of all soft drinks), fruit drinks (25%) and iced tea
(8%). Soft drinks do not include fruit juices and nectars which represent a signiﬁcant part of beverage
consumption. Those products do not contain a signiﬁcant proportion of added sugar and they are thus
not directly aﬀected by the change in sugar price. In our analysis, they are included in the ’outside’
option for consumers as they are substitutes for soft drinks. In general, there are two versions of each
soft drink: a regular one which is sweetened using caloric sweeteners, and a diet one.
The industry is highly concentrated with the ﬁrst two manufacturers (the alliance Coca Cola Enter-
prises and Cadbury Schweppes, the alliance Unilever and Pepsico) sharing 88.6% of the total production
in 2004. Each of the manufacturers owns a brand portfolio even if Coca Cola and Pepsico are mainly
involved in colas products and Unilever in iced tea.
3D a t a
We use data collected by TNS WordPanel. It is a French representative survey of 19,000 households over a
three year period (2003-2005) which provides information on purchases of food products (quantity, price,
brand, store) and on characteristics of households. According to our sample, the average consumption of
regular soft drinks is 34 litres per person per year while the average consumption of diet products is 8
litres per person per year.
From the panel data, we selected the 11 main national brands (NB) of the soft drink industry and
three private labels (PL), one for each of the three categories of products (colas, iced tea, fruit drinks). We
select the nine largest retailers in France. Taking into account the set of products carried by each retailer
we get 105 (or 104 depending on the period) diﬀerentiated products which compete on the market.2
Market shares are deﬁned as follows. We consider the total market of SSBs including soft drinks, fruit
juice and nectar. This is considered as the relevant market. Market shares of a given brand in a given
retailer is deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of purchases of the brand in the selected retailer during a period
2From the consumer perspective, a product is the combination of a brand and a retailer.
3Table 1: General Descriptive Statistics for Prices and Market Shares.
Prices (in euros per liter) Market Shares
Mean (std) Mean in %
Outside Good 66.2
Soft Drinks 0.82 (0.25) 33.8
Regular products 0.78 (0.26) 80.8
Diet products 0.92 (0.16) 19.2
National brands 0.93 (0.153) 73.1
Private labels 0.47 (0.13) 26.9
of four weeks and the sum of purchases of all brands in all retailers in the relevant market during the
same period. In this setting, the outside option represents 66% of the whole market and is composed of
the purchases of fruit juice and nectar (40% of the market) as well as purchases of other soft drinks or
purchases of the considered soft drinks in non considered retailers (26% of the market).
As shown on Table 1, the average price over all products and all periods is 0.82 euros per liter. Regular
products dominates as they represent about 80% of soft drinks purchases; their prices is 15% lower than
prices of diet products. PLs hold about 27% of the market of soft drinks and are sold at about half of
the price of NBs.
Average NB prices vary from 0.74 to 1.12 €/l while PL prices range from 0.38 to 0.54 €/l. Market
shares of retailers are also heterogenous and vary from 2% to 20%. On average, prices in the diﬀerent
retailers are similar except for two retailers which sell at signiﬁcant lower prices because a large share of
their sales comes from private labels.
4 Models and methods
To analyze strategic pricing in food chain, we follow the general methodology recently developped to
analyse vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers (e.g. ??). We ﬁrst consider a demand
model to get price elasticities of demand for every product. The model needs to be as ﬂexible as possible
and we opt for a random coeﬃcients logit model (??). As strategic pricing in the channel can be modiﬁed
by the nature of contracts between ﬁrms of the sector we design alternative models of vertical relationships
between processors and retailers. From the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing each model of vertical
relationship and estimates of demand, we are able to calculate price cost margins for manufacturers and
retailers from which we deduce cost estimates. To choose the model of vertical relationship that best ﬁts
the data, we estimate a cost model where calculated cost from each vertical relationship model is the
endogenous variable and then use a non nested ? test to select the best model. Finally, using the selected
model, we simulate the impact on consumers prices and consumption of policies. The reader will ﬁnd
much more explanations in ? about the details of the methods.
4.1 The Demand Model: a random coeﬃcients logit model
We use a random-coeﬃcients logit model to estimate the demand model and elasticities. The indirect
utility funtion Vijt for consumer i buying product j in period t is given by
Vijt = βj + γt − αipjt + ρilj +
2 X
k=1
τikck(j) + ξjt + εijt
4where βj are product ﬁxed eﬀects which capture the (time invariant) unobserved product character-
istics, γt are time ﬁxed eﬀects which capture time demand shocks, pjt is the price of product j in period
t and αi the marginal disutility of price for consumer i, lj i sad u m m yr e l a t e dt oa no b s e r v e dp r o d u c t
characteristic (which takes 1 if product j is a diet product and 0 otherwise) and ρi captures consumer i’s
taste for the diet characteristic, ck(j) is a dummy that takes 1 if product j belongs to product category
k and τik represent the consumer i’s taste for category k, ξjt captures the unobserved variation in the
product characteristics and εijt is an unobserved individual-speciﬁc error term.
We assume that αi, ρi and the τik vary across consumers. Indeed, consumers may have a diﬀerent
price disutility or diﬀerent tastes for the diet characteristic or for categories of products considered. We





























0 a 4x1 vector which captures the unobserved consumers characteristics.
Σ is a 4 × 4 diagonal matrix of parameters (σα,σρ,στ1,στ2) that measure the unobserved heterogeneity
of consumers. We suppose that Pv(.) is a parametric distribution of vi.
We can break down the indirect utility given by Vijt = δjt + µijt + εijt.into a mean utility δjt and a
deviation from this mean utility µijt.
The consumer may decide not to choose one of the products considered. Thus, we introduce an
outside option allowing for substitution between the considered products and a substitute. The utility of
the outside good is normalized to zero. The indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Vi0t = εi0t.
Assuming that εijt is independently and identically distributed like an extreme value type I distrib-









k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)
!
dPν(ν) (1)
where Ajt is the set of consumers who have the highest utility for product j in period t, a consumer
is deﬁned by the vector (νi,ε i0t,...,εiJt). We assume that Pν is independently and normally distributed
with mean α, ρ, τ1,τ2, and standard deviation σα,σ ρ,σ τ1,σ τ2 respectively.
4.2 Supply models: vertical relationships between processors and retailers
The economic literature has extensively explored vertical relationships between manufacturers and re-
tailers (e.g. ?). In food retailing, upstream and downstream industries are highly concentrated and it is
well known that with chain of oligopolies linear contracts are not eﬃcient as the proﬁt of the chain is not
maximised. Indeed, this provides incentives to agents to design more sophisticated contracts such as non
linear contracts. In the empirical literature, it is only recently that two-part tariﬀs were integrated in the
analysis (??). In this paper, we consider both linear pricing, and a set of two part-tariﬀs contracts where
processors have all bargaining power.3 The general framework of vertical relationships is described by
the following game:
• stage 1: Manufacturers propose simultaneously take-it or leave-it contracts to retailers; depending
on the supply model, we deﬁne only the wholesale price if we assume linear contract, or both a ﬁxed
fee and wholesale price in case of two part tariﬀs, and ﬁnally we specify consumer price in addition
to the ﬁxed fee and wholesale price for contracts including resale price maintenance;
3This primarily aﬀects how proﬁts are shared (through the ﬁxed fees) rather than the choices of prices which is what is
studying here. According to ?, equilibrium prices would be the same if retailers have all bargaining power.
5• stage 2: Retailers simultaneously accept or reject the oﬀers which are public information. If a
retailer rejects one oﬀer, he gets his outside option which is either a positive ﬁxed value if private
labels are not acknowledged or the proﬁt coming from private labels otherwise;
• stage 3: Retailers set consumer prices.




[M(pj − wj − cj)sj(p) − Fj] where M is the size of the market, Sr the set of products that
retailer r sells, wj and pj the wholesale and retail prices of product j, sj(p) the market share of product j
and cj the constant marginal cost to distribute product j.I nt h es p e c i ﬁcc a s eo fp r i v a t el a b e l s ,w ea s s u m e
that they are sold to retailers at marginal cost by the producing ﬁrms. Assuming price competition among




[(pk − wk − ck)]
∂sk
∂pj
=0 ∀j ∈ Sr, for r =1 ,...,R (2)
These are standard conditions deﬁning the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the third stage of the game.
These conditions are valid whatever manufacturers propose linear prices or two-part tariﬀs.4
In the following we focus on two-part tariﬀs, as the linear case is now well known (refer to ???). Let
deﬁne µj the constant marginal cost to produce product j and Gf the set of products sold by manufacturer
f. The manufacturer maximizes its proﬁt Πf =
P
j∈Gf
[M(wj −µj)sj(p)+Fj] subject to the participation




j −wj −cj)sj(e pr) where e Sr is the set of
private labels belonging to retailer r and e pr =( e pr
1,..., e pr
J) is the vector of prices when retailer r sells only
its private labels. By convention, we have e pr
j =+ ∞ for all brands sold by retailer r except for private
labels. The vector of market shares s(e pr) thus corresponds to market shares when retailer r sold only his
private labels.
Manufacturers can adjust franchise fees such that all constraints are binding. Using the participation

















The proﬁt of a manufacturer is no longer a function of the ﬁxed fees attached to his own products.
Rather his proﬁt depends on the ﬁxed fees set by the other manufacturers. Everything happens as if
the manufacturer chooses only either wholesale prices (no resale price maintenance) or consumer prices
(resale price maintenance).
Here we only present the case where manufacturers can use resale price maintenance in their contracts






















=0 ∀j ∈ Gf, for f =1 ,...,Nf
(3)
The above conditions only apply for NBs. For PLs, retailers maximize their proﬁt with respect to the







j −wj −cj)sj(p∗) where p∗
j stands for
4With resale price maintenance, it is manufacturers who determine consumer prices of national brands. Retailers have
only a strategic role in setting prices of private labels. Then, the FOC deﬁned only apply for the subset of private labels
retailer r distributes.
6the price of NBs choosen by manufacturers. Thus, for PLs, additional equations are obtained from the
ﬁrst order conditions of the proﬁt maximization of retailers which both produce and retail these products:
X
j∈h Sr







j − wj − cj)
∂sj(p∗)
∂pk
=0 ∀j ∈ e Sr, for r =1 ,...,R (4)
Basically, the system of equations 3 and 4 characterises the equilibrium which depends on the structure
of the industry at the manufacturer and retailer levels and the demand shape. It should be noted that,
because wholesale and retail margins cannot be identiﬁed in this system, it will be needed to have
additional assumptions on the margins.
4.3 Cost speciﬁcation and testing between alternative models
Once the demand model is estimated and for each model of vertical relationship, price-cost margins are
estimated. We thus obtain estimated costs Ch
jt = pjt − Γh
jt − γh
jt for each product j in period t for any
supply model h,w h e r eΓh
jt = wh
jt−µh





is the margin of retailer on product j. We specify a ﬁxed eﬀects model for estimated marginal costs and













where Wjt is a vector of inputs, wh
j represents product ﬁxed eﬀects for model h, wh
jy(t) allows to
diﬀerentiate the product ﬁxed eﬀect for product j across years and τh
t is a monthly ﬁxed eﬀect for











t . To be consistent with the economic theory ?,w ei m p o s et h ep o s i t i v i t yo fp a r a m e t e r s
λ
h
k and use a non linear least square method to estimate them. We use this cost function speciﬁcation
to test any pair of supply models Ch
jt and Ch0
jt and infer which model is statistically the best using a non
nested Rivers and Vuong test.
4.4 Simulations
Using the estimated marginal costs from the preferred model of contracts in the vertical chain as well
as the other estimated structural parameters, one can simulate the policy experiments of interest. We
denote Ct =( C1t,..,Cjt,..,CJt) the vector of marginal costs for all products present in period t,w h e r e






t − Γt (p∗
t) − γt (p∗
t) − e Ct
° ° °
where k.k is the euclidean norm in RJ, γt and Γt correspond respectively to the expression of retail and
wholesale margins for the best supply model and e Ct is the vector of marginal cost estimated using the
new sugar price.
7Table 2: Results of the random-coeﬃcients logit model.
Coeﬃcients (Std. error) Mean Standard Deviation
Price -7.04(0.41) 2.35 (0.43)
Diet 0.52 (0.02) 0.26 (0.23)
Soda category 1.90 (0.02) 2.96 (0.45)
Ice tea category -0.71 (0.02) 2.89 (0.59)
Coeﬃcients δj,γt not shown
Overidentifying Restriction Test (df) 19.43 (15)
5 Results on demand and vertical relationships
5.1 Demand results
We estimated the random coeﬃcients logit model using the well-known GMM method proposed by ?,
? and ?. This method requires the use of a set of instruments to solve an omitted variables problem.
Indeed, prices may be correlated with the error term of demand equations as unobserved characteristics
included in the error term might be correlated with prices (e.g. advertising, promotions). In order to
get unbiased price eﬀects, we choose instruments aﬀecting the marginal cost curve. In practice, we use
input price indexes of wages, plastic, aluminium, sugar and gazole as it is unlikely that input prices are
correlated with unobserved demand determinants. These variables are interacted with manufacturers
dummies because we expect that manufacturers obtain from suppliers diﬀerent prices for raw materials.
Table 2 shows results of the demand model estimates by GMM. The overidentifying restriction test is
not rejected which means that instruments are valid. On average, the price has a signiﬁcant and negative
impact on utility. Given the value of the price standard deviation, only 0.1% of the distribution of the
price coeﬃcient is positive. The coeﬃcient of the dummy identifying diet products is positive on average
meaning that consumers like this characteristic. Whereas the soda category is prefered to the fruit drink
category, consumers prefer fruit drinks to ice teas. However, standard deviations for both categories are
large meaning that some consumers prefer them and some others do not prefer.
From the structural demand estimates, we compute own and cross-price elasticities for each diﬀer-
entiated products (Table 3). Own-price elasticities of demand for a brand vary between -1.66 and -5.66
and is -4.13 on average. A key result is that demand for regular products is less elastic than demand
for diet products (diet products are brands 2, 4, 6 and 9). Indeed, mean own-price elasticity of demand
for regular brands is about -3.93 while it is about -4.65 for diet brands, these means are statistically
diﬀerent. These results are in line with those obtained by other studies of the soft drink market in the
US, specially if one takes into account the way brands are deﬁned. Thus, price elasticity of demand for a
’product’ does depend on the deﬁnition of the product. A priori, the more brands are distinguished in the
analysis the higher the elasticity of a single brand. ? estimate own price elasticities to -2 for Coca-Cola
and Pepsi-Cola. Using a higher level of disagregation (about 20 brands) for the US market, ? found
e l a s t i c i t i e sr a n g i n gf r o m- 3t o- 6i nt h eD e n v e ra r e a .
The analysis of cross-price elasticities among products in a given retailer reveals that all products are
substitute as all cross-price elasticities are positive. Substitutions are mainly among products in same
categories.
8Table 3: Own and Cross Price Elasticities between Brands within the same Retailer
Brand1 Brand2 Brand3 Brand4 Brand5 Brand6 Brand7 Brand8 Brand9 Brand10 Brand11 Brand12 Brand13 Brand14
Sugar R D R D R D R R D R R R R R
Categ. 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 3
Brand1 -4.4514 0.0141 0.0077 0.0076 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0184 0.0020 0.0024
Brand2 0.0180 -4.4510 0.0140 0.0145 0.0021 0.0021 0.0025 0.0023 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0229 0.0026 0.0032
Brand3 0.2370 0.2341 -4.6570 0.2287 0.0394 0.0372 0.0479 0.0470 0.0483 0.0488 0.0486 0.2512 0.0388 0.0472
Brand4 0.0991 0.1038 0.0976 -4.8877 0.0165 0.0167 0.0213 0.0210 0.0230 0.0215 0.0215 0.1040 0.0161 0.0203
Brand5 0.0077 0.0073 0.0083 0.0081 -4.8089 0.1392 0.0189 0.0195 0.0190 0.0177 0.0180 0.0055 0.1124 0.0137
Brand6 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0284 -4.9310 0.0039 0.0040 0.0042 0.0036 0.0037 0.0010 0.0229 0.0028
Brand7 0.0070 0.0069 0.0080 0.0084 0.0158 0.0157 -4.3426 0.0316 0.0298 0.0272 0.0279 0.0043 0.0093 0.0192
Brand8 0.0079 0.0078 0.0092 0.0097 0.0189 0.0190 0.0366 -4.4429 0.0361 0.0323 0.0333 0.0045 0.0103 0.0215
Brand9 0.0044 0.0047 0.0051 0.0056 0.0099 0.0109 0.0187 0.0196 -4.3680 0.0172 0.0176 0.0027 0.0059 0.0121
Brand10 0.0064 0.0064 0.0071 0.0074 0.0129 0.0130 0.0239 0.0244 0.0238 -4.0948 0.0230 0.0046 0.0089 0.0177
Brand11 0.0039 0.0039 0.0044 0.0045 0.0080 0.0081 0.0150 0.0155 0.0151 0.0141 -4.1880 0.0026 0.0053 0.0108
Brand12 0.0334 0.0337 0.0134 0.0127 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0016 0.0016 -2.7464 0.0038 0.0044
Brand13 0.0033 0.0032 0.0025 0.0024 0.0354 0.0357 0.0035 0.0033 0.0036 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037 -3.3226 0.0058
Brand14 0.0068 0.0068 0.0058 0.0059 0.0085 0.0085 0.0146 0.0141 0.0147 0.0152 0.0151 0.0066 0.0096 -2.9183
R means regular; D means diet
5.2 Prefered model, price-cost margins and cost estimates
Thanks to demand estimates, we compute price cost margins for each supply model. On the basis of
Rivers and Vuong tests (results not shown) the best supply model is the model where manufacturers
and retailers use two part tariﬀs contracts with resale price maintenance5, and where private labels have
no strategic role in the manufacturer-retailer relationships. It is coherent with the idea that in this
industry brands are strong thus providing market power to upstream producers. According to these
results, price cost margins are 45.3% of consumer price on average. Average price-cost margins for PLs
(38.65%) are signiﬁcantly lower than for NBs (47.4%). Price-cost margins for diet brands (49.5%) are
signiﬁcantly higher than for regular products (43.6%). Price cost margins do not diﬀer across retailers
except for retailer 8 and 9 which are ’hard discounters’ and sell mostly their own brands. Estimated
marginal cost calculated from the best supply model is 0.45€/litre on average. Average marginal cost of
PLs (0.30€/litre) is lower than NBs (0.50€/litre).
6 Impact of the sugar policy reform
We simulate the impact of a signiﬁcant decrease in the EU sugar price. Thus, over the last 20 years, the
sugar price in the European Union was well above the world market price. However, in February 2006 a
reform of the EU sugar policy was introduced which would lead to a signiﬁcant decrease in the EU sugar
price (?). The reference price, which roughly acts as a ﬂoor price, would be reduced by 36% over a 4-year
period starting in 2006.6
In line with the anticipated impact of the reform of the EU sugar policy, we simulate a 36 % decrease in
the sugar price. Using the estimated marginal cost speciﬁcation for the best supply model, we ﬁnd a 2.52
5Resale price maintenance (RPM) is prohibited by competition authorities. However, in France, speciﬁcl a w so nt h e
retail industry led to a situation where RPM was in practice possible to implement (?).
6T h er e f e r e n c ep r i c ef o rw h i t es u g a rw a s6 3 1 . 9 €/t from 1 July 2006 to 30 September 2008. It was 541.5€/t from 1
October 2008 to 30 September 2009 and 404.4€/t after 1 October 2009. By comparison, in 2007, the average world market
price of sugar was about 310€/t. (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/minco/manco/cmo/index.htm)
9Table 4: Impact of a decrease in the sugar price
Change in cost Change in price Pass-through Change in MS
in % in % 4p/4c in %
Mean (std) Mean (std) Mean (std) Mean (std)
Brand 1 -10.69 (3.21) -4.45 (0.59) 1.09 (0.02) 11.20 (1.49)
Brand 2 — 0.83 (0.12) - -12.06 (0.90)
Brand 3 -7.08 (0.69) -3.55 (0.19) 1.09 (0.02) 9.15 (1.10)
Brand 4 — 0.74 (0.08) - -11.44 (0.81)
Brand 5 -3.34 (0.35) -2.05 (0.18) 1.07 (0.03) 3.62 (0.83)
Brand 6 — 0.57 (0.10) - -8.92 (0.81)
Brand 7 -4.05 (0.51) -2.78 (0.26) 1.16 (0.03) 7.66 (0.92)
Brand 8 -4.22 (0.34) -3.12 (0.18) 1.23 (0.04) 9.71 (0.75)
Brand 9 — 0.66 (0.06) - -7.47 (0.85)
Brand 10 -5.07 (0.52) -3.27 (0.24) 1.13 (0.03) 9.18 (0.74)
Brand 11 -5.27 (0.60) -3.55 (0.27) 1.16 (0.03) 10.80 (0.83)
Brand 12 -14.55 (0.75) -7.65 (2.31) 1.05 (0.02) 10.62 (3.97)
Brand 13 -6.66 (3.24) -4.21 (1.07) 1.08 (0.02) 7.64 (0.90)
Brand 14 -8.20 (2.38) -5.61 (0.95) 1.12 (0.01) 12.70 (1.30)
€ cents (or 7.09%) decrease in the total marginal cost of regular soft drinks. An estimate which is close
to what is obtained from accounting calculation (about 2 € cents). The percent decrease varies across
brands (Table 4) because both sugar content and marginal cost diﬀer across brands. Thus, marginal cost
of PLs is lower than marginal cost of NBs partly explaining the larger percent decrease in marginal cost
of PLs.
On average, in response to the price cut, consumer price decreases by 4.15% for regular products.
The percent price decrease for PLs is larger as they are cheaper than NBs. For regular products the
pass-through, measured by the ratio of the diﬀerence in retail prices over the diﬀerence in marginal
costs, is 1.11 on average. Therefore, if the marginal cost decreases by 1 cent the retail price decreases
on average by 1.1 cents. The industry overshifts the cost decrease. This result is consistent with the
supply model. Indeed, using two part-tariﬀs contracts with resale price maintenance allows the industry
to behave non competitively. Moreover, ? show that a monopoly producer facing several retailers can use
this type of contract to implement the monopoly situation. The pricing rule of monopoly might lead to
a pass-through larger than 1 as in our empirical results. This result is also consistent with the analysis
of ? who found that pass-through rates in the food industry in France are larger than one (1.41). Besley
and Rosen (1999) also found, in the US case, that the soft drink industry overshifts tax changes.
The pass-through varies by brand, meaning that taking into account strategic behavior of diﬀerentiated
products is important. It should be acknowledged that the model integrates the brand portfolio of the
manufacturers. Thus a manufacturer chooses his pricing policy for the whole set of products, internalising
substitution among his own set of products. The price of diet products does not change signiﬁcantly; their
price increases by less than 1% that is about 1€ cent. As a result of these strategic reactions, the aggregate
market share of regular products increases by 9.3% which comes from substitution with diet products
whose market share decreases by 10% as well as with the outside option whose market share decreases
by 3.2%.7
Most studies on food taxation argue assuming passive pricing rather strategic pricing provide an
upper bound of the impact of the simulated tax. For each policy scenario, we estimated the change in
consumption under passive and strategic pricing. With strategic pricing the changes in consumption
7The price of the outside option is assumed to be unchanged as a signiﬁcant part of the goods in the outside option will
not be aﬀected by the decrease in the sugar price.
10Table 5: Changes in SSB consumption (litre per person per year)
Passive pricing Strategic pricing
Regular products 1.36 (0.05) 1.56 (0.06)
Diet products -0.29 (0.00) -0.43 (0.00)
are larger (Table 5). The claim that passive pricing provides an upper bound is thus not veriﬁed. That
claim is valid only when pass-through is lower than one. However, given the way the industry behaves
pass-through is larger than 1. For regular products, ignoring strategic pricing leads to under-estimate the
change in consumption by 15%. For diet products, the under-estimate reaches 50%.
7C o n c l u s i o n
As links between food intake and health are more and more recognised, there is a growing interest in
the ex ante analysis of the health impacts of alternative food price policies. A frequently used method-
ology consists in a two-stage procedure which combines ﬁrst a demand model and then a health model,
meaning that assessing the impact on food consumption of simulated policies is an essential step in this
methodology. Most of demand analyses assume that producers fully transmit to consumers the tax or
subsidy, they then make the standard assumption of passive pricing. Some of them argue whether the
change is not fully transmitted, the analysis then provides an upper bound of the impact on consumption.
The case of over transmission is not taken into account.
This paper provides a general methodology for assessing impacts of price policies on the food con-
sumption taking into account pricing strategies of both manufacturers and retailers in the food chain.
As an example, we analyze the impact of a change in sugar price or a change in the level of taxation of
those products in the soft drink industry. Using the recent development of empirical industrial organi-
z a t i o n ,w eh a v ee s t i m a t e dav e r yﬂexible demand model, a random coeﬃcients logit model, and several
models of vertical relationships of the industry. We have shown that the most likely supply model is
the one where manufacturers and retailers use two-part tariﬀs contracts with resale price maintenance
and where private labels play no role in manufacturer/retailer relationships, meaning that manufacturers
have a large market power. Using this model, we have simulated the impact on prices of a decrease in
sugar price taking into account the strategic choice of agents. We have shown that the pass-through was
larger than 1 in average, the industry would then transmit to consumers more than the change in input
cost. In particular, we showed that ignoring strategic pricing would lead to under-estimate the change
in consumption by 15% for regular products and by 50% for diet products. We thus conclude that when
analysing food price policies, it is needed to take into account strategic pricing.
In a longer run, producers might also adapt the composition of their products to taxations or subsidies
put in place. For example, if sweetened products are taxed according to their sugar content, this might
provide incentives to producers to lower the sugar content of their product in order to avoid or limit
t h ei m p a c to ft a x e s . D e a l i n gw i t hs u c ha ni s s u er e q u i r es additional information on the composition of
products, as well as integrating a choice of quality by producers. An issue which as far as we know is
not integrated in the empirical models of industrial organization and then in analysis of public health
policies.
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